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RESUMEN
Uno de los grandes problemas que plantea la publicidad en tiempo real es proporcionar una
atribución justa a cada canal, cuando impactan conjuntamente. Desde la aparición de la publici-
dad digital, el modelo hegemónico en este ámbito ha sido el modelo de última interacción. Sin
embargo, en los últimos años ha crecido el interés en las empresas por explorar otros modelos
de atribución que utilicen más información.
Aunque es difícil resumir de forma concisa la labor realizada en el presente trabajo, este
engloba inicialmente dos objetivos principales: Uno de ellos es hacer una introducción a los
modelos de atribución en la compra programática en marketing digital y obtener modelos en di-
cho mercado más allá del modelo de última interacción. Por otro lado, los modelos de atribución
han sido desarrollados mediante la teoría de juegos. El otro objetivo es mostrar y desarrollar
cómo se ha utilizado la teoría de juegos en este entorno.
La tesis está dividida en dos partes: la primera parte hace una puesta al día de dos con-
ceptos: en el primer capítulo a la compra programática y en el segundo capítulo se hace una
introducción a los juegos cooperativos. En la segunda parte se explica cómo aplicar la teoría de
juegos al problema concreto y su implementación en la práctica. Se muestran diversos resulta-
dos de salida e información relevante. Por último, se incluye un capítulo de conclusiones.

ABSTRACT
Among the most important problems that online publicity poses is providing a fair attribution
to each impact channel. Since the appearance of digital publicity, the last interaction model has
been the hegemonic model in this environment. However, in the last few years the interest of
companies in exploring other attribution models which use more information has risen.
Despite the fact it is difficult to summarize this thesis, it includes initially two main ob-
jectives: one of them is performing an introduction to attribution models within programmatic
buying in digital marketing and obtaining models beyond the last interaction one. Secondly,
attribution models have been developed by means of game theory. The other goal is therefore
showing and developing how game theory has been used inside this environment.
The dissertation is divided into two parts: the first refreshes two concepts: programmatic
buying in the first chapter and cooperative games in the second chapter. In the second part
application of game theory and implementation in practice is covered. Some output results
and further relevant information is shown. Finally, the last chapter contains some achieved
conclusions.
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Part I
Introduction to Attribution Problems in
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Online marketing was born in 1993 and has grown at the same time as the evolution of new
technologies. Nowadays, technology allows us to organize this market fulfilling the goals nego-
tiated by both buyers and sellers, in a response time measured in milliseconds. The explosion
of online users caused the increase in the number of websites. Figure (1.1) shows the how the
amount of internet users raised between 1990 and 2014. That is the reason why the ecosystem
needed an easier mediation between demand and supply.
The appearance in 2008 of programmatic trading, the technology behind the RTB, which
allows us to buy and sell digital publicity in real time, implies the beginning of a new gener-
ation of players in this ecosystem. It is the moment when trade was carried out mechanically
according to different criteria defined by buyers and sellers, giving rise to Real-Time Bidding
or programmatic buying.
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Figure 1.1: Interne u ers rise. Ret ieve from http://data.worldbank.org/
Real-Time Bidding (RTB) ([1]) is a method for trading online display advertising place-
ments through real-time auctions that occur in the time it takes a website to download. The
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auction process takes place across media exchanges that connect sellers (publishers) and buyers
(advertisers).
The trade does not differ from any other market. From the demand point of view, the
advertiser is the entity charged with executing an advertising campaign. This includes finding
the right audience and showing the suitable ad. On the other hand, the publisher or inventory
is the place where ads will be shown and will be the supplier in this market. These publishers
offer appropriate spaces with the objective of obtaining the biggest earnings.
1.1 RTB Marketplace
Before we get into some of the inner essentials of this ecosystem, let us have a short and
intuitive clarification of the terminology of the players in the display advertising ecosystem. We
will divide the classification in two groups according to supply and demand.
• Supply
We can find one important player when it comes to supply. The inventory or publisher,
which is the place where ads will be shown. In particular, it could be any website which
has room available for ads. To allow advertising networks to optimize the inventory per-
formance automatically, there are advertising technology platforms called Supply Side
Platform (SSP).
• Demand
On the Demand side, we can find two important players, marketers and advertisers. The
marketer or brand is the one who is interested in advertising. They determine the total
available budget for the campaign. It could be for instance Coca Cola that wants to
promote a new product. The advertiser is the entity charged with executing the campaign.
This includes finding the right audience and showing them the ad. The advertiser uses a
technology called Demand Site Platform (DSP). Sometimes the advertiser itself is called
informally DSP. These, also know as bidders, “bid” for the inventory using data from the
audience, so that the purchase is done impression by impression. An impression is an ad
that is reproduced in the inventory. DSPs provide technology and knowledge for:
– Valuing every available impression individually and buying the optimal ones for the
campaign. In this process diverse methods and algorithms for optimization are used.
– Integrating data, adding the entire information available (own, from data providers
or even from the marketer) to improve the decision criteria.
An example of DSP company is Digilant S.L., where this dissertation has been done.
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• Other important players
There are other players or elements who participate in this market, but they are not labeled
neither in demand or supply. The most important one is the Ad-Exchange, an online
platform that facilitates automation of real-time bidding. Therefore, it is the place where
demand and supply are reunited.
ADVERTISER ADVERTISER ADVERTISER ADVERTISER
1’00 € 0’55 € 0’ 40€ 0’ 90€
DSP DSP
AD EXCHANGE / SSP
BID BID
WEBSITE / PUBLISHER
DELIVERY AD
CLIENT
Figure 1.2: Simplified diagram of the real time bidding ecosystem
1.2 What is a cookie and its life cycle
A cookie ([2, 10]) is conceptually a person who is going to receive the ad. From the
advertiser’s perspective:
1. A user visits a website, where the DSP has a pixel, and a cookie is written in his web
browser to recognize him again.
2. DSP anonymously track the browser’s Internet behavior.
3. The SSP computes a floor price for this inventory.
4. A bid request is made and sent to Ad exchange.
5. Every particular DSP receives the bid request and computes a bid:
(a) Previously, the browsing history has been used to score the user. If he has a score
high enough, he is placed into a discrete segment. It is useful to discretely limit the
set of eligible cookies, for which the RTB forwards big requests. Each campaign
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has multiple segments for different thresholds and different models. Typically only
about 1% of the browsers qualify for any segment of a given campaign.
(b) At the time of the request, DSPs already know the user’s cookie, the current inven-
tory, as well as additional generic information about the user agent, etc. Thus, they
know which segment the user is in, and decide the optimal bid according to their
information.
6. The DSP with the highest bid wins the auction and gets to show the creative for the
campaign and pay the price for the second highest bid. The ad is displayed and this event
is called impression.
7. The cookie is observed for some campaign-specific conversion period, recording if the
user converts.
8. If the user does not convert, the entire process is repeated, and is re-scored the more data
is collected.
9. At some point, the user may delete its cookie and is no longer known. If it is observed
again, he will receive a new cookie.
 
 The user visits a website with 
some adverts space 
The space is sold in an auction in 
real time. The supply and the 
demand get in contact.  
The bid floor is sent to the 
advertiser.  
The advertiser (DSP) sends a 
bid 
All the bids are received. The 
DSP that bids higher wins the 
auction.  
The winner’s advertisement is 
shown. 
< 100 ms 
Figure 1.3: Cookie Life Cycle.
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1.3 The problem of evaluating different channels
In the real-time bidding environment, a user or cookie is impacted through diverse chan-
nels. These channels may be physical channels as computers, tablets, smartphones, etc. How-
ever, the channels will be defined as something more abstract. Previously, let us define the
conversion concept. A conversion is an event that indicates that the selected user has bought
the desired product or simply a user that has done a beneficial purchase. Knowing formally
what a conversion is, a channel is defined as any feature from the data available that has influ-
ence on the conversions.
Example 1.3.1. Suppose we have the following 6 rows extracted from a database sorted by
time. Each row contains information of impressions.
User ID Device Day Time Ad’s size
User1 PC Morning Small
User2 PC Morning Large
User1 Tablet Afternoon Medium
User3 Smartphone Afternoon Small
User3 PC Evening Small
User2 Smartphone Evening Small
It means that at some point in the morning, user number 1 has been impacted with a small
add in his pc, later has been impressed in the afternoon with a medium size add in his tablet and
so forth.
Typically, the previous information will be together with the information of which users
have been converted. For instance, it can be stored in the following table:
User ID Conversion
User1 0
User2 1
User3 1
The previous table means that users 2 and 3 have converted, whereas user 1 has not. As
first consequence we deduce that channel “smartphone” could be a very good channel because
every user who has been impacted through it has converted. In this manner, channel “Small”
should be also good, because all the smartphones impacts are done through small ads.
Sometimes the conversion information is attached in the data table and “conversion” it is
modelled as a type of event. There can be also clicks. A click occurs if a user literally clicks on
the displayed ad. The data usually mixes different types of events as shows the following table:
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User ID Device Day Time Ad’s size Event
User1 PC Morning Small Impression
User2 PC Morning Large Impression
User1 Tablet Afternoon Medium Click
User3 Smartphone Afternoon Small Impression
User3 PC Evening Small Conversion
User2 Smartphone Evening Small Conversion
From the previous example, we could think of a channel just as an attribute from a categor-
ical variable. Moreover, it will be also useful to understand it as a player in a cooperative game
as will be seen later.
The problem of rating channels according to their performance of conversions is a difficult
problem and in principle there could be more than one approach to solve this problem. For
instance, classification problem techniques and other mathematical tools can be utilized for this
purpose. In this work, we will use cooperative game theory and determine a fair payment to
each channel.
1.4 Attribution theory
In the core of the problem of evaluating different channels based on conversions is the
attribution theory. This theory has become a major research paradigm on social psychology
and is concerned with how individuals interpret events and how this relates to their thinking
and behaviour. Heider (1958) was the first to propose a psychological theory of attribution, but
Weiner (1974) and other scientists developed a deeper theoretical framework.
A few of the possible things we can study by means of the attribution theory are:
• How do we attach meaning to other’s behaviour, or our own?
• Is someone angry because is bad-tempered or because something bad happened?
• In the real-time bidding environment, has a conversion occurred because of the last im-
pression we served or due to a long path of impressions which has influenced the user’s
behaviour?
The models which are built in this monograph are developed using mathematical tools. How-
ever, it is important to take into consideration that many of studies of behaviour attribution have
been done from a psychological point of view.
1.5 Attribution Models in real-time bidding
An attribution model is a rule or a set of rules, which determine how conversions are
assigned to some impressions or ads. As has been said above, there are several ways to approach
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the problem. In this section several important concepts are defined that will be used throughout
the thesis.
In order to have better knowledge about the users that are being impacted in any publicity
campaign, we can store the information about all the impressions that the user has received.
This leads to the following definition of path:
Definition 1.5.1. A path of a given cookie is a vector containing all the events in the history of
a given campaign for that cookie.
In example 1.3.1, the device type smartphone has been given an important attribution be-
cause the last device through an impression has been posted is smartphone. Thus, only a piece
of information has been used to assign attribution. The aim is to use more information of data
to make our conclusions safer.
1.5.1 Attribution models classified by time
There are various types of models according on how the issue of time is addressed. The time
is relative to the conversion event. It can be depicted ordering the events towards conversion or
from conversion. In figure 1.4 an example can be seen with events from conversion. However,
we will represent it the other way for the rest of this work.
Figure 1.4: Attribution model that gives more attribution to the first events.
Last interaction attribution model
If we think about the way of reasoning in example 1.3.1, we assigned more attribution to
the events that impacted right before the conversions than the other events. This is done because
intuitively we think the last ads have had more influence on the conversions.
The model that includes this idea is the last interaction attribution model. Assigns 100%
of the conversion value to the last channel with which the user interacted before converting. In
figure 1.5 a last interaction model can be seen. The x-axes represents 5 different touchpoints
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in this case, ordered by time, being the fifth one the closest to a conversion event. The y-axes
represents the amount of attribution given to every touchpoint, in percentage.
This model is the most extended one and the easiest to implement compared to the others.
However, it could ignore an important amount of information because sometimes paths exceed
a length of 1000 impressions.
Figure 1.5: Last Interaction Model. All the attribution goes to the last touchpoint.
First interaction attribution model
Assigns 100% of the conversion value to the first channel. It is useful in channels where
the awareness effect takes the best importance. However, it is not widely seen.
Figure 1.6: Last Interaction Model. All the attribution goes to the first touchpoint.
Presence attribution model
Also called flat attribution model or “One Each” Each touchpoint is equally important
during the attribution process.
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Figure 1.7: Presence Interaction Model. The attribution is shared equally by all the touchpoints.
Time decay attribution model
This model is based on the concept of exponential decay and most heavily credits the
touchpoints that occurred nearest to the time of conversion. It has the shape of an increasing
function. At first glance, the name may be misleading, because the function is increasing, not
decreasing as the name suggests. The reason is the following: if we represent the histogram
according to the distance to conversion as in 1.4, it has the shape of a decreasing function. That
is the reason of its name.
Figure 1.8: Time decay Model.
Customized attribution model
Finally, it is common to design customized models according to results or experience.
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Figure 1.9: Customized model. The analyst chooses the attribution of each touchpoint.
1.6 Types of Strategies in Real-time bidding
Another important issue to face is choosing what strategies to take in the RTB environ-
ment. Note that the concept of whether a strategy is better than another can be subjective and
change depending on what the goals of the campaign are. If it is preferable to achieve as many
conversions as possible, then we will opt for an aggressive strategy, bidding at a high price in
the auctions. On the contrary, if we have a small budget, we will opt for cheaper offers and will
bid more intelligently.
To summarize, one way of possible classification of tactics or strategies in real-time bid-
ding is prospecting and retargeting. The first one seeks to create awareness of a single product,
whereas the aim of retargeting is to impact a limited number of users who have previous engage-
ment and therefore a high probability of conversion. Note that they are exclusive, this means we
have to use both strategies, first to create product awareness and second to make conversions.
Awareness 
Prospecting 
Interest 
Intention 
Retargeting 
Conversion 
Figure 1.10: Main phases in a cookie life towards conversion.
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It is important to highlight that most of the cookies will remain in the beginning of the
funnel, not being impacted through any retargeting strategy.
In the cookie available data, a feature called strategy will exists in most of the cases. And
possibly another feature called Line Item (substrategy) may exists. The purpose of this last
one is to set numerical specifications to the strategies, or focus them to a reduced segment of
cookies. Finally, we can rate all these strategies or line Items with the attribution model, and
check their performance.
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Chapter 2
Review of cooperative games. The Shapley
Value
2.1 Cooperative Games
One of the objectives of this work is to give a fair attribution to each channel in a way
which will be seen later. One of the possible approaches to do so is by means of cooperative
game theory, and the method for doing this will be seen in chapter 3. For now we will focus the
attention on recalling basic theory of cooperative games.
Definition 2.1.1. A cooperative or coalitional game with transferable utilities consists of:
• A finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
• A characteristic function v : 2N → R that assigns to every subset S of N , a real number
v(S) (worth of the coalition), being v(∅) = 0.
Therefore, a gameG is determined if a pair (N, v) is given. Once a game is given, the main
aim should be giving a fair payoff to each player. Formally is called a solution concept and is a
vector x ∈ Rn.
Example 2.1.1. Let (N, v) be a game of N = {1, 2, 3} players and a total prize of 1 million $.
If at least two players form a coalition, they get the total prize, but any player separately cannot
attain any prize. Thus,
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = v(2, 3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 1
The game is normalized, so that the total prize is set to 1. If a coalition is formed, let us
say, {1, 2}, with equal payoffs for each player in that coalition, x(1) = x(2) = 1
2
, one can argue
that every offer from the third player to for example the second one will be accepted if that offer
is greater than 1
2
. Thus, every coalition can be answered with another offer and it is not possible
to find a stable solution as in non-coalitional games.
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That is why a different approach is followed in this type of game and it consists in finding
a fair payoff for each player xi with the condition that the sum over all the payoffs is the total
prize:
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N). In game theory, the previous condition is called efficiency.
Definition 2.1.2. A game G = (N, v) is monotone if ∀S ⊂ T ⊂ N with S ∪ T = ∅,
v(S) ≤ v(T )
Definition 2.1.3. A game G = (N, v) is said to be simple if v(S) ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊂ N and is
monotone.
Thus, the previous game is simple.
Definition 2.1.4. A game G = (N, v) is superadditive if ∀S, T ⊂ N such that S ∩ T = ∅,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T )
It is immediate to prove that every superaditive game which takes positive values is mono-
tone. The most important and most intuitive games are the superadditive ones. The latter follow
the idea of “The union makes the force”. Non-superadditive games are uncommon.
Definition 2.1.5. A game G = (N, v) is (0, 1)−normalized or just normalized if
v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1,
0 ≤ v(C) ≤ 1, ∀C ⊂ N
Note that the last condition is dispensable if the game G is superadditive.
2.2 Set solutions for coalitional games
To delimit the set of solutions of the game one can add suitable restrictions according to
find a suitable payoff for each player. The most basic one is to impose efficiency, and this set is
called the set of preimputations:
PI(v) = {x ∈ R/
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N)}
However, the previous set is very large and barely delimits the possible set of payoffs.
Another plausible restriction is to impose xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N . The meaning of this is that every
possible payoff is at least as large as the quantity the player would get forming a single coalition.
Formally, this set is called the set of imputations:
I(v) = {x ∈ PI(v)/xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N}
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According to the previous idea, one could impose not only xi ≥ v(i) in single coalitions, but∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N , i.e., also in coalitions with more than one player. This set is called
the core of the game:
C(v) = {x ∈ PI(v)/
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N }
Note that those can be many restrictions and sometimes the core could be empty. For instance,
in example 2.1.1, the restrictions are:
xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} , x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1 + x2 ≥ 1, x1 + x3 ≥ 1, x2 + x3 ≥ 1
If we sum the three last restrictions we reach:
2x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 ≥ 3 ⇒ x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 1.5
In contradiction to x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, therefore the core is empty.
2.3 Punctual solutions. The Shapley value
Now instead of finding set of payoffs, the aim is to find punctual solutions called values.
Formally, if GN is the set of games with N players, a value ϕ is a function such that
ϕ : GN → Rn
(N, v)→ ϕ(v)
There are different values such as the nucleolus, the τ−value and the Shapley Value, which
have been studied by numerous researchers. We are going to focus on the Shapley Value, which
is the most famous one and also very intuitive.
The Shapley value is based on the concept of marginal contribution. Given a set S ⊂ N
and a player i /∈ S, the marginal contribution of i in S is given by
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) (2.1)
The Shapley value is defined in every player i ∈ N by the following formula
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N
i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] (2.2)
and can be seen as a weighted average over all possible subsets of N . The meaning of the
weights s!(n−s−1)!
n!
follows next: Imagine that the players meet in a meeting point. Every order
of arrivals must have the same probability. Given i /∈ S ⊂ N , the probability that the whole
coalition S have arrived before i is exactly s!(n−s−1)!
n!
.
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This reasoning leads to another way of calculating the value. First of all, let us recall
the definition of a permutation: a permutation is a biyection of any single set S (generally
S = {1, 2, . . . , n}) with itself. Normally the permutations are given in the two line notation, for
example one permutation of 4 elements may be:
pi =
(
1 2 3 4
2 4 1 3
)
The set of all possible permutations of a given set S is noted by pi(S). So the idea is not
grouping the coalitions as in formula 2.2, but sum over all possible permutations of N directly,
thus
φi(v) =
1
N !
∑
pi∈pi(N)
[v(P pii ∪ {i})− v(P pii )] (2.3)
where P pii = {j : pi(j) < pi(i)}. The disadvantage of this formula against 2.2 is that there are
more addends to sum, but it can be useful in some situations.
Once reached this point, we wonder of what interesting properties the Shapley value satis-
fies and if it can characterized by some of them.
The answer is that it is the unique value that satisfy the following four properties:
1. Efficiency: The total payment of the game must be divided, i.e.
n∑
i=1
φi = v(N)
2. Symmetry: If i and j are two players who are equivalent in the sense that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) ∀S ⊂ N : i, j /∈ S
Then φi(v) = φj(v).
3. Zero player behaviour: The Shapley value of a null player is zero, φi(v) = 0. A player i
is null for v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all coalitions in N .
4. Linearity: If two cooperative games described are by the gain functions v and w, the sum
game (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) should correspond to the gains derived from v and w
separately:
φi(v + w) = φi(v) + φi(w) ∀i ∈ N
Furthermore, for every a ∈ R,
φi(av) = aφi(v)
The three last properties are trivial to prove from the definition. Thus, let us prove effi-
ciency is satisfied. Using the second definition to calculate the Shapley value,
n∑
i=1
φi(v) =
n∑
i=1
1
N !
∑
pi∈pi(N)
[v(P pii ∪ {i})− v(P pii )] =
1
N !
∑
pi∈pi(N)
n∑
i=1
[v(P pii ∪ {i})− v(P pii )]
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=
1
N !
∑
pi∈pi(N)
[v(N)− v(∅)] = v(N)
In example 2.1.1, the Shapley value results φ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
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Part II
Addressing attribution problems by means
of the Shapley Value
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Chapter 3
Using cooperative games for attribution
problems
The main goal of this monograph is to use game theory to build attribution models. The
first task to solve is to choose a suitable game G = (N, v). In this game, the set of players N
would be the different values that can take a single feature of the data 1.
Thus, in example 1.3.1, if we choose the feature device, the set of players is:
N = {PC, Tablet, Smartphone}
The next problem that arises is to choose the worth of the game v for each coalition. It has
not been immediate. The first idea that occurs immediately is to set the worth of every coalition
as the amount of conversions accomplished by the coalition. If we note by CT (equivalently
Cj1,...,jl , T = {j1, . . . , jl}) the number of conversions achieved by T ⊂ N , the worth of every
coalition is simple:
v(T ) = CT (equivalently v(j1, . . . , jl) = C(j1,...,jl))
The problem with this definition is that the game is not superaditive. In particular, it is not
monotone. In this manner, the single coalition {PC} could achieve more conversions than the
coalition {PC, Tablet}. In the example 1.3.1, the first coalition achieves 1 conversion, but the
second does not achieve any conversion.
As a consequence, the incremental contributions 2.1 are negative. This is not intuitive, we
follow the simple idea that says the more players in a coalition are, the better the coalition is.
Thus, we can think of adding all the conversions achieved by each element to the worth
coalition. Then, the conversion associated game is defined in every subset of players S ⊂ N as
v(S) =
∑
T⊂S
CT (3.1)
1The algorithm is also designed to combine more than one feature and build a game with the cartesian product
of the features.
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where each CT is the number of conversions achieved through the set of channels T simultane-
ously. If the previous formula is developed, it leads to:
v(S) =
∑
j∈S
Cj +
∑
j1>j2
j1,j2∈S
Cj1,j2 + · · ·+
∑
j1>···>jk−1
j1,...,jk−1∈S
Cj1,...,jk−1 + CS
Result: The superaditive property is guaranteed in any game defined as above.
Proof. Let be S, T ⊂ N . Let us prove that v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ):
v(S ∪ T ) =
∑
U⊂S
CU +
∑
V⊂T
CV +
∑
W⊂S∪T
W*S,T
CW ≤
∑
U⊂S
CU +
∑
V⊂T
CV = v(S) + v(T )
The goal is to calculate the Shapley Value on the previous game to give a fair attribution to
each channel.
The Shapley value has many advantages as it allows us to calculate diverse attributions
and it is very intuitive as it weighs the marginal contributions. However, its main drawback is
the fact that its computation has an exponential complexity as n increases. In some cases that
I have found throughout this dissertation, the number of different channels can exceed 40, so
computationally it is extremely difficult to calculate the Shapley value. This is the reason why
another approach needs to be chosen to calculate the attributions.
In [9] a sample method is used to determine approximately the Shapley Value in polynomial
time. However, analyzing the behaviour of the different campaings for the clients, we observed
the interaction among the channels does not usually exceed the number of 3 channels as it can
be seen in figure 3.1.
Knowing this useful information, the following approach follows the formula of the Shap-
ley value, but instead of calculating every element in the sum.
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N
i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
only the combinations
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N
s≤k
i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] (3.2)
A similar idea can be used as well in the second formula of the Shapley Value:
φi(v) =
1
N !
∑
P
[
v(SiP ∪ {i})− v(SiP )
]
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Figure 3.1: Venn Diagram for the interaction of users split by different strategies for an auto-
mobile company campaign.
But summing only among the permutations
φi(v) =
1
N !
∑
pik∈pik(N)
i≤k
[v(P piki ∪ {i})− v(P piki )] (3.3)
where pik are all the possible k-permutations of N . The k-permutations of a set N of n > k
elements are all the different subsets of N with cardinal k. For instance, all the possible 3-
permutations of N = {1, 2, 3, 4} are
pik = {1, 2, 3}, pik = {1, 2, 4}, pik = {1, 3, 4}, pik = {2, 3, 4}
P pii is intuitively defined after the definition of Pi: P
pi
i = {j : pik(j) < pik(i)}.
As said, the interactions among channels are not often large in number, so a small k will
suit.
3.1 Potential Information to extract using an attribution model
With the powerful tool of game theory we can evaluate the different sources that influence
on conversions, (also on clicks and visits).
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Among the things that our model can evaluate are: it can split the time of the day and
evaluate what time is better. Also, it is available extract the location information of the data and
can build an attribution model on the cities. The program can evaluate different strategies and
it can rate the types of formats for our ads.
Example 3.1.1. If we have a campaign with the following data:
ID Time Event Device Format
User 1 2016-03-01 09:37:23 Imp Smartphone 60x100
User 2 2016-03-01 09:37:43 Imp PC 160x200
User 2 2016-03-01 09:37:58 Imp PC 300x250
User 2 2016-03-01 09:38:03 Imp PC 300x250
User 3 2016-03-01 09:38:20 Imp Tablet 160x200
User 2 2016-03-01 09:38:23 Conversion PC 300x250
User 3 2016-03-01 09:38:49 Imp Tablet 160x200
User 4 2016-03-01 09:39:04 Imp Smartphone 60x100
User 3 2016-03-01 09:40:28 Conversion PC 300x250
User 4 2016-03-01 09:42:07 Imp Smartphone 60x100
User 4 2016-03-01 09:44:31 Conversion Tablet 160x200
Remark that the information a conversion row has involves the information of the last
impression the cookie has. Thus, a conversion row brings implicitly 2 types of information: a
conversion itself and the information of the last impression the cookie was impacted.
The conversion associated game as defined in 3.1, for feature device, with a last interaction
attribution model would be:
v(PC) = 2, v(Tablet) = 1, v(Smartphone) = 0, v(Tablet, Smartphone) = 1
v(PC, Tablet) = 3, v(PC, Smartphone) = 2, v(PC, Tablet, Smartphone) = 3
So if we calculate the Shapley Value the result is very intuitive:
φ(PC) = 2, φ(Tablet) = 1, φ(Smartphone) = 0
because the values obtained are the number of conversions lastly touched for each channel. For
a standarized game,
φ(PC) =
2
3
, φ(Tablet) =
1
3
, φ(Smartphone) = 0
Obviously, this is a small example and if we were using real data we would have to use formulas
3.2 or 3.3. If we make a presence attribution model for the same feature, the worth of each
channel is:
v(PC) = 1, v(Tablet) = 0, v(Smartphone) = 0, v(Tablet, Smartphone) = 1
v(PC, Tablet) = 2, v(PC, Smartphone) = 2, v(PC, Tablet, Smartphone) = 3
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The Shapley value is:
φ(PC) =
3
2
, φ(Tablet) = 1, φ(Smartphone) =
1
2
And if the game is standarized,
φ(PC) =
1
2
, φ(Tablet) =
1
3
, φ(Smartphone) =
1
6
So the presence Shapley makes Smartphone participate in the last conversion, and that is
the reason why it shares some of that conversion attribution with Tablet.
3.2 Key Performance Indicators
Sometimes the number of conversions does not provide the required or desired informa-
tion. Often it is desirable to have the information of how efficient the channels are and other
useful data. This information is known in the business environment as KPI’s (Key performance
indicators). The most used ones in real-time bidding are the Conversion Rate, CPA, CPC and
CPM.
Definition 3.2.1. The Conversion Rate for a given feature is the proportion of impressions
served for each conversion, i.e.
CR =
Number of Conversions
Number of Impressions
In example 3.1.1, the number of impressions for PC, Tablet and Smartphone are respec-
tively 4,4 and 3. So in the last interaction case,
CRPC = 0.5 CRTablet = 0.25 CRSmartphone = 0
The Shapley presence leads to:
CRPC = 0.5 CRTablet = 0.125 CRSmartphone = 0.167
This can be better visualized in figure 3.2
Definition 3.2.2. The CPA (cost per acquisition) for a given feature is the amount of money that
costs in mean every conversion. i.e.,
CPA =
Total Cost
Number of Conversions
Definition 3.2.3. The CPC (cost per click) for a given feature is the amount of money that costs
in mean every click. i.e.,
CPC =
Total Cost
Number of Clicks
36 CHAPTER 3. USING COOPERATIVE GAMES FOR ATTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
Figure 3.2: Conversion Rate for the different devices.
Definition 3.2.4. a CPM (cost per mille) is the amount of money that costs in mean every
thousand of impressions, i.e.,
CPA =
Total Cost
Number of Impressions
· 1000
3.3 Time Decay Modelling
As has been said previously, new channels can be created according to features of data or
relevant information modifying some fields.
We have created a new feature which arises from splitting the time into intervals. Each
interval will be now a channel to rate, and those channels will be split according to time before
conversion.
So time has been split into minutes before conversions, creating 5 intervals. Another ad-
ditional interval has been added to include the rest of the time as it can be seen in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.4 shows similar results for hours.
Figure 3.3: Time by minutes. The chart is a zoom of the last 5 minutes.
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Figure 3.4: Time by hours. The chart is a zoom of the last 5 hours.
3.3.1 Creation of a Time Decay Model
According to figures 3.3 and 3.4 the behavior of conversions follows an exponential decay
shape. In this manner, the attribution function does not get concentrated in the last impression
as a last interaction model, but on the other side it is not constant as the presence model. So it is
clear that the function has another shape, so the aim of this section is to roughly find it. Recency
(time to conversion) distribution of impressions has been studied for different campaigns as
figure 3.5 shows.
Figure 3.5: Time Decay.
There are some ways we could think to build an attribution model. The method chosen
takes intervals such as the ones in figures 3.3 and 3.4 and combine those channels with the set
of channels N we want to rate. Formally, a new extended game G = (N∗, v∗) is defined, and
the players of this game are
N∗ = N × {Receny0, Recency1, . . . , Recencyni}
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where {Receny0, Recency1, . . . , Recencyni} are set of intervals and × represents the cartesian
product. Note that the computation of the Shapley Value for this game will take much longer
than the original one because there are more channels now. Even if we use the formulas 3.2
or 3.3, we have to use a greater k parameter, because the interaction will increase due to the
increased number of channels.
The worth of each coalition is simply defined by the number of conversions each coalition
S ⊂ N achieves in each interval:
v∗(S,Recencyj) =
∑
T⊂S
CjT
Where
CjT = Number of conversions achieved by i in Recencyj interval
Also, as there is no interaction among the intervals,
v∗(S,R) =
∑
j∈R
v∗(S,Recencyj)
where R is any set of intervals.
For example 3.1.1, if we have 3 intervals {Receny0, Recency1, Recency2}, the players of
the game would be
(PC,Recency0), (PC,Recency1), (PC,Recency2)
(Tablet, Recency0), (Tablet, Recency1), (Tablet, Recency2)
(Smartphone,Recency0), (Smartphone,Recency1), (Smartphone,Recency2)
and we could set worth to each coalition using the method above defined.
The method to set a value to each channel is to solve the extended game G = (N∗, v∗), so
that each “player” (i, Recencyj) has a value
x∗(i, Recencyj) = Number of conversions attributed to i in Recencyj interval
And finally the value of each channel is defined as
xi =
ni∑
j=1
x∗(i, Recencyj)
The last question to answer is what intervals we should choose. The cuts have been chosen
in such a way it makes the histograms of impressions have the same area as in figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Where to cut recency?
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Chapter 4
Results of Applying to Real Data
The data that is going to be used in this work comes from 2 campaigns for 2 different
companies:
• A campaign in the USA for an automobile company from the 1st March of 2016 to the 31st
of the same month. It consists of 7,621,852 rows or instances of 9 fields each row. The
fields follow next: cookieID, town, device, timestamp, event, format, domain, website,
lineitem and strategy.
• A famous Spanish insurance company between the 1st of November of 2015 and the 1st
of January of 2016 (2 months). It has 7,044,755 rows of 9 fields each row. The fields are
exactly the same as in the automobile campaign.
4.1 Comparison of Strategies
First of all, it is important to understand what the differences are between the two different
ways to impact users: prospecting and retargeting. The first one aims to create awareness of
the company, whereas the second one aims to accomplish as many conversions as possible.
Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of conversions achieved by prospecting and retargeting in the
automobile campaign.
Figure 4.1: Conversions achieved for every strategy.
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Obviously, the more impressions a strategy consumes, the more conversions it achieves.
That is why the appears into scene to solve that problem. The proportion of impressions used
by every strategy can be seen in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Proportion of impressions required for each strategy.
Retargeting has always better conversion rates as it shows figure 4.3. This occurs because
the cookies targeted by this strategy have high probability of conversion, and therefore more
conversions are achieved with the same number of impressions.
Figure 4.3: Conversion Rate for every strategy.
In figure 4.4 a scatter plot of cookies according to the impressions they received can be
observed. The x axes shows the number of prospecting impressions (in a logarithmic scale) the
cookie has received and the y axes represents the number of retargeting impressions received
(in a logarithmic scale).
In order to see better the location of conversions, the ratio between converters and non
converters has been increased as in figure 4.5. Note that the majority of converters have been
impacted by a large number of retargeting impressions.
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Figure 4.4: Ratio of converters 1:30.
Figure 4.5: Ratio of converters 1:3.
4.2 Comparison of Substrategies
Different ways of approaching the goal of getting a good number of conversions spending
a small amount of money are used in companies within the programmatic buying ecosystem.
For example, in some circumstances it could be useful to show a large amount of prospecting-
type adds to create awareness. On the other hand, sometimes it could become more convenient
to show more personalized adds. There are many options and parameters to choose for a given
campaign.
For example, one retargeting-type line item could cover the goals of:
• Serving 3× 105 impressions
• Achieving 1000 clicks
• Achieving 300 conversions
For example, for the automobile company the names of the strategies have been made
anonymous, and the conversions accomplished by every strategy can be seen in figure 4.6. The
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number of impressions and the total cost in shown in figure 4.7. Strategy 1 is the one that gets
the majority of conversions. However, it is the most expensive one, which makes think it will
not have a good CPA. Indeed, as shows figure 4.8, Strategy 1 has a low CPA. This strategy
is a retargeting-type one, because it consumes many impressions, but it is expensive, and that
usually happens to retargeting.
On the top of CPA with have Strategy 2, which does not achieve many conversions, but in
mean they are very cheap.
In figure 4.9 we can see the Conversion Rate and see that Strategy 6 has the best perfor-
mance, because of the low number of conversions required to get 5000 conversions.
Figure 4.6: Conversions attributed.
Figure 4.7: Total number of impressions and total cost.
Finally, according to the graphics, we might think at first sight that the models are very
similar. However, this is still far from truth as shows figure 4.10. The difference between
Shapley Presence and Last Impression rise to 60%.
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Figure 4.8: CPA.
Figure 4.9: Conversion Rate.
4.3 By Day Time
As it has been said previously, we can evaluate the number of conversions achieved de-
pending on the moment of the day. As can be seen in figure 4.11, there is an increasing trend of
conversions in the beginning of the day.
Figure 4.11: Distribution of conversions achieved by time for the insurance campaign (first plot)
and for the automobile campaign (second plot).
46 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS OF APPLYING TO REAL DATA
Figure 4.10: Difference between models.
However, we have to take into account the number of impressions as shown in figure 4.12.
Note they have similar shapes to the conversions graphs except morning in the insurance cam-
paign.
Figure 4.12: Distribution of impressions by time for the insurance campaign (first plot) and for
the automobile campaign (second plot).
4.4 By Format
With the definition of channels as any feature that influences the conversion, we can ana-
lyze the impact of different variables such as the size of the ad:
In general terms, the largest an ad is, the most likely it achieves conversions. Conversion
rate for the automobile campaign can be seen in 4.13 and CPA can be seen in 4.14
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Figure 4.13: Conversion Rate.
Figure 4.14: Cost Per Acquisition.
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Chapter 5
Recapitulation
5.1 Summary of the work done
Digital publicity is a field in rise and omnipresent in our day to day. Diverse professionals
of different disciplines, working for different companies, meet in this field to improve and
discuss the current available tools. Among those disciplines, the most common ones are Data
Science, Big Data, Informatics in general, Statistics and as seen in this work and Game Theory
is very helpful when it comes to attribution models. Game theory (in particular, auction theory)
can be also utilized to model and optimize the auctions that take place before the purchase of
the space.
Regarding the development and completion of this thesis, much work has needed to be
done. In the first place, understanding and going in depth in Online Publicity to understand
better the problem. Once updated with respect to the situation of the problem, an introduction
to Game Theory has been indispensable to investigate. In particular, some concepts of the
Shapley Value which were first collected in the article of Lloyd Shapley ([8]). These concepts
have been recalled in the Game Theory Unit in the Master.
The largest difficulty and also wealth of the thesis lies in the combination of two different
disciplines: Online Publicity and Game Theory. The fact that with the attribution model we can
prompt business KPI’s of campaigns is an important step.
Moreover, there is a third difficulty that have been present throughout this entire job: the
big volume of data and the complexity of calculations. In the beginning of this work, the
Shapley Value was being computed in R storing all possible computations among channels in
an inefficient manner. Soon, we realized that ways to focus the work needed to be changed,
specially in computational terms. Then, it seemed suitable to work with python, in our opinion
a very appropriate language in this case, given it is a lower level language, with comfortable
access to work with data files. Also the package “itertools”, which provides efficient iterators
for permutations and combinations, has been very useful. The code in python takes more than
1000 lines and a schema of its functions and its relations can be seen in figure 5.1 in the annex.
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Finally, it has been necessary to spend time choosing the most suitable campaigns and
retrieving data, to make reports and plot descriptive graphs.
5.2 Conclusions
Let us recall in the introduction we fixed two main objectives for this work. One of them
was building attribution models using Game Theory. Despite the fact barriers as complexity
calculation of the Shapley value have been faced, the computational improve in 3.2 solve this
problem because the interaction among channels is not excessively large. In this manner, we
can say this goal has been achieved satisfactorily.
The other objective, inseparable from the first one, was building a more general attribution
model than the last interaction one. Two of them have been created, the Presence attribution
model and the Time Decay attribution model. The Presence model produces good results and
it does not require hard computational work. As seen throughout this thesis, sometimes re-
sults of time decay presents large differences to Shapley Presence and Last Interaction or lies
half way between them. However, often the Time Decay model does not produce meaningful
differences with the Shapley Presence model. Therefore, it is generally preferable the Shap-
ley Presence one, besides it is computationally cheaper. Future research lines might involve
building improved time decay models and create customized models based on previous data.
Finally, we have to say that Cooperative Game Theory provides an effective and intelligi-
ble tool to rate channels and to choose suitable strategies. The calculation of the KPI’s with
three different models can be extremely helpful in industry to choose among tactics, impact
timestamps, ad formats and so forth. Remark that the analysis done in this dissertation have
been descriptive-type. The information provided opens new horizons for strategy optimization
models.
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Annex: programming
A set of scripts that follows the diagram of the figure 5.1 has been used throughout this
dissertation. It consists of two scripts:
• ATMain: This is the main program. First of all, retrieves all the functions from “ATFunc-
tions.py”. Secondly, the main options such as graphics output, time modelling and so on
are set up. Finally, with these options set up, ATMain initializes the class “cookies.py”
with the name Paths.py and uses all the functions of that class as well as other functions
of “ATFunctions.py”.
• ATFuntions:
– Cookies2path: Class with multiple options: Reads the raw data, creates a path of
converters, calculates the Shapley value according to three models, etc.
∗ _init_: Built-in python statement to initialize classes.
∗ readInput: It reads the entire input file and saves the information in two dictio-
naries: conversor2path and nonconversor2path.
· ProcessLine: Storage the information of every line keeping only the impor-
tant fields.
· dateTime2TimeStamp: Transform the dates to seconds.
· parseDateTime: Needed by dateTime2TimeStamp.
∗ shapleyFromConversorFile:
· getUserChannels: For every cookie, creates a subdictionary with all the
impacted channels .
· calcIncrementalContributions: Previous to calculate the Shapley value
· calcPermutationParticipation: Previous to calculate the Shapley value.
· calcShapley: Calculates the Shapley Value.
· standarizeShapley: Calculate Conversion Rates.
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∗ timeDecayEvents: Splits the events by time.
· groupTimeDecayEvents: Aggrupates the events removing the time split.
∗ Delnonconversors: Deletes the dictionary of non converters.
∗ printConversors: Write all the converters in an output file.
– logisticRegression: Computes a logistic regression.
– treeClassifier: Computes a decision tree.
– someGraphics: Depicts scatter plots.
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ATMain.py 
ATFunctions.p
y 
Cookies2
path 
__init__ 
ShapleyFrom
ConversorFile 
getUser 
Channels 
CalcIncremental
Contributions 
calcPermutation
Participation 
calcShapley 
standarize
Shapley 
readInput 
process 
Line 
dateTime2
TimeStamp 
parseDate 
Time 
Delnon 
Conversors 
print 
Conversors 
timeDecay
Events 
groupTime 
DecayEvents 
logistic 
Regression 
print 
Conversors 
tree 
Classifier 
someGraph
ics 
             
: calls 
: contains 
legend : functions 
: python scripts 
: classes 
nImpEvents 
Figure 5.1: Function relationship diagram of the python code used.
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